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I. Does a police drug detection canine snitY of the front door of a private home 
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enhanced senses to reveal intimate details about the home?
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The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court is reported at Jctrdines v. State^ 73 So. 3d 34
(Fla. 2011).
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mixed questions of law and fact are entitled to deferential review when it appears that 
the [trial] court is ‘better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or 
that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.” Salve Regina
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Coll. V. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Review under a clearly 
erroneous standard is highly deferential and requires a “definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed” in order to overturn. Concrete Pipe & Prods, of Cal. Constr.
Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cai, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). See infra. Part II.C for further 
discussion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Facts
Acting on only an anonymous tip to a general crime stoppers telephone line, Detective 
Pedraja led a joint task force of the Miami-Dade Police Department’s Narcotics Bureau and 
federal Drug Enforcement Agency to Joelis Jardines’s private residence. (J.A. 16.) The
uncorroborated tip alleged that Mr. Jardines was growing marijuana in his house. (J.A. 109.) 
Local and federal authorities watched Mr. Jardines’s home for fifteen minutes. (J.A. 16.)
During the fifteen-minute period, law enforcement made two observations: (1) Mr. Jardines s 
blinds were closed and (2) there were no vehicles in the driveway. (J.A. 8-9.) Detective Pedraja 
broadcast these lackluster findings to additional law enforcement units in the residential 
neighborhood even though Miami-Dade Police and DEA officers were already outside ol Mr. 
Jardines’s home. (J.A. 109.)
Despite his training and experience with suspected marijuana grow houses. Detective 
Pedraja did not attempt to substantiate the anonymous tip prior to launching a coordinated, multi­
agency surveillance operation. (J.A. 43.) Detective Pedraja testified that a grow house would 
require an abnormal amount of electricity. (J.A. 41.) A utilities bill could have reflected the 
unusual amount of energy required to keep a hydrophonic marijuana lab’s lamps glowing. (J.A. 
42.) Detective Pedraja admitted that he could have accessed Mr. Jardines’s utilities bill with
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either a court order or subpoena, botii of which cairy a lower evidentiary burden than a search 
waiTant. (J.A. 42.) Detective Pedraja did not inquire about the amount of energy used in Mr. 
Jardines’ home. (J.A. 42.) Despite his years of law enforcement experience, Detective Pedraja 
elected neither to utilize the lawful mechanisms of the court nor to corroborate the anonymous 
allegation prior to leading a multi-agency, organized force to Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 43.)
After staking out Mr. Jardines’s private residence, Detective Bartelt and his trained 
canine strode across Mr. Jardines’s property toward the front door. (J.A. 33.) While the police 
canine and his handler entered the property, Sgt. Ramirez and Detective Donnelly of the Miami- 
Dade Police stood nearby, watching the private residence. (J.A. 109.) Agents from the Dmg 
Enforcement Agency and the Miami Police Department surrounded Mr. Jardines’s property. 
(J.A. 109.) None of the officers knocked to announce their presence or approached the front 
door before Detective Bartelt and his police canine. (J.A. 32.) Detective Pedraja approached the 
home but remained behind Detective Bartelt and his animal. (J.A. 33.)
Detective Bartelt walked across Mr. Jardines’s private property. (J.A. 58.) He stationed 
himself at the base of the front porch. (J.A. 50.) Detective Bartelt was approximately six to 
eight feet from the home’s front door. (J.A. 45.) Due to the police dog’s wild and undisciplined 
nature, Detective Bartelt maintained tight control of the animal’s leash during the investigation. 
(J.A. 52.) Detective Bartelt encouraged the canine to cross the porch s threshold, pass through 
an archway, and enter the alcove of Mr. Jardines’s private space. (J.A. 49.)
While searching Mr. Jardines’s private porch, the police animal focused on the base of 
the front door. (J.A. 53.) The canine sat down on the porch. (J.A. 53.) Detective Bartelt, who 
was still holding his leash, understood this to mean that the animal had located the strongest 
point of an odor. (J.A. 51-53.) Detective Bartelt notified Detective Pedraja of the dog’s alert
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and put the animal in his vehicle. (J.A. 53-54.) Minutes after the canine sniff of Mr. Jarclines's 
front door, tlie canine team moved on to their next operation. (J.A. 54.) Detective Bartelt and 
his dog had many other investigations scheduled. (J.A. 54.)
Both Detective Bartelt and his police canine were trained in basic and advanced search 
techniques. (J.A. 13.) Detective Bartelt has been with the Miami-Dade Police’s Narcotics 
Bureau for six years, has participated in over six hundred controlled substances searches, has 
been certified in narcotics detection, and attends weekly maintenance training within the 
Narcotics Bureau. (J.A. 11-12.)
According to Detective Pedraja’s warrant affidavit, “[t]he smell of live marijuana is a 
unique and distinctive odor unlike any other odor." (J.A. 9.) However, at the conclusion of the 
police canine’s investigation, Detective Bartelt noticed only the smell of mothballs. (J.A. 55.) 
Detective Bartelt did not smell marijuana. (J.A. 55.) When Detective Bartelt smelled the easily 
identifiable odor of mothballs, he was standing in close proximity to the supposed source of the 
suspected marijuana odor. (J.A. 55.)
Detective Bartelt did not inform Detective Pedraja that he smelled mothballs near the 
front door of Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 55.) Despite his extensive training and experience, 
Detective Bartelt did not detect the very distinct odor of marijuana at any point during his 
investigation of Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 55.) Canines, on the other hand, are unable to 
differentiate between their trained scents, which may include products with a similar chemical 
make-up. (J.A. 53.)
After Detective Bartelt and the police dog left Mr. Jardines’s front porch. Detective 
Pedraja entered the porch for the first time and approached the front door. (J.A. 36.) Detective 
Pedraja smelled what he believed to be live marijuana. (J.A. 36.) Detective Pedraja did not
smell marijuana until after Deteclve Bartelt's canine detected an odor. (J.A. 36.) Detective 
Pedraja knocked on the front door before vacating Mr. Jardines’s porch. (J.A. 37.) While in the 
area of the front door, Detective Pedraja heard an air-conditioning unit for the first time since he 
stepped onto Mr. Jardincs’ properly. (J.A 37.) After observing the unit running for less than 
twenty minutes, Detective Pedraja concluded that the air conditioner corroborated his suspicion 
of marijuana growth in the home. (J.A. 37-38.)
Detective Pedraja compiled the findings of the morning’s coordinated surveillance and 
investigation into an affidavit for a search warrant. (J.A. 9.) He then petitioned for lawful 
permission to search Mr. Jardines’s property, including the curtilage. (J.A. 15.) In his affidavit, 
Detective Pedraja claimed that the combination of closed blinds, lack of a vehicle in the 
driveway, supposed smell of marijuana, and an active air conditioner could be “indicative of 
marijuana cultivation.” (J.A. 8-9.) Judge Sarduy signed the warrant. (J.A. 17.)
While Detective Pedraja acquired the search warrant, the Drug Enforcement Agency 
continued watching Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 110.) An hour after Judge Sarduy issued the 
warrant, members of both the Miami-Dade Police Department’s Narcotics Bureau and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency stormed Mr. Jardines’s home through the front door. (J.A. 17.) Upon 
searching Mr. Jardines’s home, the joint task force found an alleged marijuana lab. (J.A. 17.) 
Mr. Jardines was apprehended by a federal agent in his own backyard. (J.A. 17.)
Preliminary Statement
Over one month after the joint Miami-Dade Police Department and Dmg Enforcement 
Agency surveillance operation and search of Mr. Jardines’s home, the Miami-Dade County 
Prosecutor filed charges against Mr. Jardines for alleged cannabis trafficking. (J.A. 2.)
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190, Mr. Jardines moved to suppress 
evidence uncovered during the search of his home. (J.A. 16-20.) Mr. Jardines urged, among 
other things, that the Miami police’s trained narcotics detection canine’s sniif of his private 
residence constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. (J.A. 17-18.) Therefore, 
the results of the police canine’s test could not form the basis for probable cause, which was 
required to conduct a constitutional search of Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 17-18.) With the 
benefit of substantial briefing and oral argument, Circuit Court Judge William Thomas granted 
Mr. Jardines’s motion to suppress, following clear Florida precedent on the same issue. (J.A. 
134-136.) Judge Thomas held that the police canine’s investigation of Mr. Jardines s front door 
was an illegal search, and that any remaining evidence could not establish probable cause for 
Detective Pedraja’s search warrant. (J.A. 134-136.)
Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal reversed Judge Thomas in direct conflict with 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006). State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d I, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The Court of Appeal 
held that the proper evidentiary basis for a canine search was “reasonable suspicion not 
probable cause, and ordered the case remanded to determine if reasonable suspicion existed prior 
to conducting the canine search of Mr. Jardines’s residence. Id.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court again reversed, in Mr. Jardines s favor. Jardines 
V. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 55-56 (Fla. 2011). The state’s high court held that not only was the canine 
sniff of Mr. Jardines’s residence a search under the Fourth Amendment, but also that the sniff 
required an evidentiary showing of probable cause. Id. at 54-56. The court expressly approved 
the decision in Rabb, and affirmed Judge Thomas’s suppression of evidence in this case. Id. at 
56.
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On January 6, 2012, Ihc United Stales Supreme Court granted the State of Florida's 
petition for writ of certiorari. (J.A. 144.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court because the drug 
detection canine sniff of Mr. Jardines’s home was a search under the Fourth Amendment and 
Miami-Dade Police conducted the canine sniff search without probable cause.
The drug detection canine sniff at Mr. Jardines’s front door was a Fourth Amendment 
search because Mr. Jardines met both prongs of this Court’s Katz test for unreasonable searches. 
First, Mr. Jardines’s exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in his home. Law 
enforcement officers noted tliat all of the blinds and windows of the home were closed and no 
cars were in the driveway. Second, society has recognized that an interest in privacy within 
one’s home is reasonable. Furthermore, this Court has upheld the common law tradition that 
affords the home a heightened protection from unlawful intrusion and investigation. Although 
the police searched the interior of the home through its emanating smells, this Court has 
extended the Fourth Amendment’s strong protections against unreasonable searches to the 
curtilage of the home, an area that includes the front porch, the physical location of the canine 
during its search. The exceptional deference given to the home distinguishes this Court s prior 
jurisprudence holding that canine sniffs are not searches as those inquiries concerned areas and 
effects with lesser expectations of privacy. Moreover, in Fourth Amendment analysis, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home is not diminished by illegal conduct taking place 
inside. Additionally, this Court has expressly disapproved of the encroaching advancements of 
sense-enhancing tools used in searches of the home. Finally, the categorical acceptance ot drug 
detection canines’ accuracy has been called into question.
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A dmg detection sniff search of a private home is only constitutional if performed with 
probable cause. Probable cause is the appropriate evidentiary standard to conduct a sniff search 
because Miami-Dade Police used a sense-enliancing tool not in general use to reveal intimate 
details regarding the interior of Mr. Jardines’s home. Rather than requiring a balancing approach 
to assess the overall reasonableness of a search, this Court has carved out a few narrow 
exceptions to the probable cause requirement. However, none of this Court’s recognized 
exceptions apply in this case, nor is an extension warranted. Police identified no special need to 
conduct the search beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Therefore, the Constitution 
requires probable cause to initiate the search of a home, and this case does not present a scenario 
in which the constitutional standard should be relaxed or modified.
ARGUMENT
I. THE UNREASONABLE INVESTIGATION OF MR. JARDINES’S PRIVATE HOME 
BY A POLICE CANINE WAS A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH BECAUSE IT 
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION’S CORE PROTECTIONS FOR THE HOME.
In order to protect individual liberties from over-reaching government intrusion, the
Fourth Amendment states, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and etfects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Without limiting the ability of law enforcement to ensure a safe society, the
Amendment restricts the government’s search powers and bans any searches that fail to abide by
the nation’s judicial and legislative safeguards.
In Kettz V. United States, this Court defined conduct that constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). Justice Harlan enumerated this Court’s now
standard two-part test. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979) (adopting Justice Harlan’s test as the controlling Fourth
(•
Amendment analysis). This test brings a necessary level of predictability to the amorphous 
notion of privacy for both citizens and law enforcement. In evaluating whether the government’s 
intrusion into a citizen’s liberties violates the Fourth Amendment, this Court requires “first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). When an individual meets both prongs, the government’s conduct rises 
to the level of a constitutional violation.
Law enforcement’s investigation of Mr. Jardines’s home constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. Throughout its inquiries into and interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, 
this Court has always recognized that “[a]t [itsj very core stands the right of a man to retreat into 
his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). The Miami-Dade Police Department’s entry into the protected, 
private areas of Mr. Jardiiies’s home to conduct an investigation of its intimate details 
exemplifies the unchecked authority that prompted the Founding Fathers to limit the 
government’s search powers. Permitting this invasion into a citizen’s private home would 
eradicate hundreds of years of jurisprudence granting the home a heightened standard of 
protection. That same desire to keep the government from invading the sanctity of the home 
distinguishes this case from this Court’s previous canine sniff Jurisprudence. Law enforcement’s 
use of a police canine—a sense-enhancing tool—is a new and dangerous means of eroding the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections, especially considering that the canines’ alerts are not always 
accurate. In light of this Court’s history of upholding the sanctity of the home, a trained, 
narcotics detection canine’s sniff of the front door of Mr. Jardines's private residence is a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.
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A. Mr. Jaidines’s Actions Intended to Keep the Public From Learning* of His Private
Conduct Satisfied the First Prona of the Katz Test by Demonstrating to Ihc Public
an Actual. Subjective Expectation of Privacy.
Mr. Jardines not only held but also outwardly demonstrated an actual expectation of 
privacy at home. Critical to any Fourth Amendment search claim, an individual must 
demonstrate an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concuiTing). “The very fact that a person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that 
he intends to have privacy, and if that inference is borne out by his actions, society is prepared to 
respect his privacy.” United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.1980).
For example, in Katz, law enforcement agents secretly attached an electronic bug onto a 
public telephone booth in order to listen to Mr. Katz’s conversations. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
Authorities suspected that Mr. Katz used the telephones to operate an illegal gambling enterprise. 
Id. at 354. When approaching the constitutional issue of whether or not the surveillance 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, this Court declared, “[i]n the first place the 
correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of 
the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’” Id. at 350. Instead, this Court established that the 
Amendment protects “people, not places.” Id. at 351. Therefore, “what [one] seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id.
Here, as in Katz, Mr. Jardines is shielded from overzealous government searches ot the 
private areas of his life by the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Although the settings of their 
intrusions are distinct, Mr. Katz’s and Mr. Jardines’s interests under the Katz declaration of 
intended privacy are nonetheless equal. Detective Pedraja's search warrant affidavit and court 
testimony state that all of Mr. Jardines’s windows and blinds were closed. After a period of 
surveillance by agents of both the Miami-Dade Police Department and the Drug Enforcement
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Agency from the street in front of Mr. Jardincs’s home, none of the agents present were able to
see into the house. In fact, Detective Pedraja cited the unusually private aspects of Mr.
Jardines’s home in his affidavit. Although not sufficient to justify the intrusive canine sniff, the
officers’ observations further substantiate that Mr. Jardines manifested an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy. As Justice Harlan noted in his concurrence in Katr.
The critical fact in this case is that ‘(o)ne who occupies it, (a telephone booth) 
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is 
surely entitled to assume’ that his conversation is not being intercepted. The point 
is not that the booth is ‘accessible to the public’ at other times, but that it is a 
temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom 
from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). When Mr. Jardines
affirmatively closed off the interior of his home to even innocent viewing from the public street,
he manifested a similar belief that the contents of his home would thereby remain private. See
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (noting that by erecting protective measures to
block his back yard from observation, Mr. Ciraolo “[cjlearly and understandably ... met the test
of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy.”). Mr. Jardines is
entitled to assume that his desire to keep his home life from the public will result in actual
privacy. Unlike a public telephone booth, “a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Mr. Jardines not only
subjectively believed in his privacy right at home but also took affirmative steps to ensure that
his home remained private. Law enforcement violated this expectation by investigating the
interior of his home through their sense-enhancing canine. Therefore, in a Fourth Amendment
analysis, Mr. Jardines’s actual belief in his right to keep his activities at home from the public’s
knowledge satisfies the first prong of this Court’s Katz test.
B. Under the Objective Prong oFthc Katz Test. Mr. Jaidines’s Actions in His Home
Arc AtYorded Not Merely a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy by Society but a
Heightened Expectation.
1. The canine’s sniff at Mr. Jardines’s front door violates the very purpose of
the Fourth Amendment and the common law’s traditional heightened 
standard of privacy for the home.
The inclusion of the home in the enumerated areas of Fourth Amendment protection 
reflects the Founders’ desire that it be free from unreasonable searches. This special protection 
for the home remains a fixture in this Court’s jurisprudence. See Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 180 (1969) C‘[W]c [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection 
which the Amendment extends to the home.”). Prior to the Revolution, the colonists lived under 
the constant threat of the lawful intrusion of the King’s government into their homes under the 
power of a general warrant. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 6! 6, 625 (1886) (“Vivid in the 
memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of 
assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists.”). The broad scope 
of the King’s authority allowed for searches “without a complainant's swearing out of specific 
allegations, the complainant’s accountability for fruitless searches, a judge's assessment of the 
grounds for the warrant, and—perhaps most importantly—clear directions to the officer as to 
whom to arrest or where to search.” Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 657 (1999). In 1774, John Adams described both the fear 
associated with an unexpected invasion of the home and the deep effect of such an intrusion on 
its victims:
[Ejvery English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and he glories 
justly in that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightful Tranquility 
which the Laws have thus secured to him in his own House.. . . Now to deprive a
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Man of this Protection ... is treai[ingj him not like an Englishman not like a
Freeman but like a Slave.
1 John Adams, Legal Papers of John Adams 137 {L. Kinvin Worth & Hiller B. Zobel eds.,
1965). In order to protect the home and reestablish it to its previously sacred place in the 
common law, the Founders enshrined its protection in the text of the Fourth Amendment.
This Court has repeatedly interpreted the Fourth Amendment to extend an especially 
prominent level of protection to the home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) 
(“The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.”). See also Wilson v. 
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-610 (1999) (‘The Fourth Amendment embodies [the] centuries-old 
principle of respect for the privacy of the home.”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 
(1984) ("[Pjrivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy tree of 
governmental intrusion . . . and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to 
recognize as justifiable.”).
For example, in Silverman, District of Columbia police officers suspected a private home 
was being used to house an illegal gambling organization. 365 U.S. at 506. Police officers set 
up an observation point in the house adjacent to Mr. Silverman’s. Id. The police then placed a 
sense-enhancing device under Mr. Silverman’s home to collect information that would later be 
admitted into his criminal trial. Id. at 506-07. This Court held that it need not “pause to consider 
whether or not there was a technical trespass under local property laws” because the officers 
usurped part of Mr. Silverman’s home during their search. A/, at 511. This Court rejected the 
government’s claim that its actions were not a search. Id. A significant element of this Court's 
decision was the traditional protection afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Here, as in Silverman, law enforcement searched Mr. Jardines s home in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s special protection. Mr. Jardines’s home is entitled to the traditional
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protections that predate this Court. In Silverman, this Court noted that the law enforcement 
agents violated the sanctity of Mr. Silverman’s home by placing a sense-enhancing device under 
the tloorboards of his home from a surveillance point next door. 365 U.S. at 506-07. Agents of 
the Miami-Dade Police Department and Drug Enforcement Agency similarly violated Mr. 
Jardines’s most protected space through a sense-enhancing canine’s sniff under his front door, 
rhe search of Mr. Jardines’s property deserves even greater constitutional protection as the 
police canine conducted his search from Mr. Jardines’s own property. As in Silverman, the 
search at Mr. Jardines’s home '‘without warrant and without consent” embodies llie fear that the 
Founding Fathers had at the fonnation of the Bill of Rights. The impetus for the Fourth 
Amendment grew out of government officials’ unchecked violations of the long-established 
expectation of privacy in the home. See generally Boyd, 116U.S.616. By investigating the 
details of his home without a warrant, the government violated Mr. Jardines's sacred privacy 
interest. The canine sniff of Mr. Jardines’s front door exemplifies the continued necessity for 
such stringent protections of the home under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Mr. Jardines’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
government searches extends to the curtilage of his home, which includes 
his private front porch.
The Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches in the home extend 
beyond the house itself See United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The 
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. This 
protection is not limited to the four walls of one's home, but extends to the curtilage ot the home 
as well.”). I'he curtilage of a home “is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated 
with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 180 (1984) (quoting fioyt/, 116 U.S. at 630). “[F]or most homes, the boundaries of the
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curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception dellning the curtilage—as the area around 
the home to which the activity of home life extends—is a familiar one easily understood from 
our daily experience." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.l2.
Mr. Jardines’s front porch is within the bounds of the house’s curtilage. See Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (“'fhe curtilage area immediately 
surrounding a private house has long been given protection as a place where the occupants have 
a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept."). In 
Ciraolo, this Court considered whether or not Mr. Ciraolo had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his back yard. 476 U.S. at 212-13. In its analysis, this Court stated, “the protection 
afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area 
intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations 
are most heightened.” Id. at 212-13. It further noted that the area in question was immediately 
adjacent to the home such that “this close nexus to the home would appear to encompass this 
small area within the curtilage.” Id. This Court accepted that Mr. Ciraolo’s back yard was part 
of his home’s curtilage. 7^/. at 213.
Here, as in Ciraolo, the police searched a small area immediately adjacent to Mr. 
Jardines’s home. In Ciraolo, this Court found that Mr. Ciraolo’s back yard was part of the 
home’s curtilage despite being used for marijuana cultivation. Id. Whereas such an unorthodox 
use of the property did not remove it from the home’s heightened constitutional protections, it 
cannot be doubted that the front porch would similarly be protected. Nothing in the record 
indicates that Mr. Jardines used his front porch in any manner that would lessen the privacy 
expectation generally afforded to such closely situated areas of the property. This Court 




because it could be plainly viewed by anyone traveling overhead. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. Mr. 
Jardines’s porch is distinguishable. Unlike the plane in Ciraolo that allowed anyone to observe 
the narcotics in Mr. Ciraolo’s back yard, the trained law enforcement agents at Mr. Jardines’s 
home required a sense-enhancing canine to detect the alleged odor of marijuana. Under this 
Court’s analysis in Ciraolo and based on its distinguishing facts, Mr. Jardines’s front porch 
should be treated as curtilage.
In cases where the area is less easily defined, this Court enumerated several factors that 
are uscftil in detennining the extent of the curtilage: (1) “the proximity of the area claimed to be 
curtilage to the home,” (2) “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the 
home,” (3) “the nature of the uses to which the area is put,” and (4) “the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” United States v. Dimn^ 480 
U.S. 294, 301 (1987). This Court does not apply these factors mechanically, but rather as an 
analytical tool “to the degree that. . . they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration— 
whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itselt that it should be placed under 
the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id.
Even if this Court were to apply its Diinn analysis, Mr. Jardines s front porch is safely 
within the property’s curtilage. For example, in Dunn, authorities made a warrantless entry into 
a barn on Mr. Dunn’s property in search of a narcotics operation. Id. at 297-98. This Court 
found that the barn was not a protected area of Mr. Dunn’s ranch, partly because it was located 
sixty yards from the house. Id. at 301-02. Additionally, this Court noted that a fence surrounded 
the house and acted as a physical separation between the bam and home. Id. This Court further 




Here, as in Dunn, law enforcement agents entered Mr. Jardines's private property without 
a warrant. However, in this case, the police investigated Mr. Jardines’s home from a position on 
his front porch, which is immediately adjacent to the house’s front door. There is no separation 
of space whatsoever between the front porch and the house. Unlike in Dunn where the bam was 
removed from the house and questionably an extension of Mr. Dunn’s home. Mr. Jardines’s front 
porch benefits from this Court’s long tradition of emphasizing proximity in its curtilage cases. 
See Cirao/o, 476 U.S. at 213 (noting the close nexus to the home when detemiining the 
curtilage’s boundaries). Such proximity is a strong indication that the area in question is part of 
the curtilage.
This case also differs from Dunn in the position of the property’s physical separators. 
While Mr. Jardines’s property features an archway that marks the separation between the front 
porch and the yard. Detective Bartelt directed his police canine through the archway. Upon 
crossing the archway, the animal entered the separated, private area of the front porch. This 
Court specifically addressed the fence around the perimeter of Mr. Dunn’s home as marking an 
area reserved as private. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302. The archway on Mr. Jardines’s property served 
a similar purpose. While the front yard itself is arguably an extension of the home and its 
heightened protections, Mr. Jardines took deliberate actions to delineate the particularly private 
area of his home from the more accessible front yard. Such conduct reflects Mr. Jardines’s 
desire for and expectation of privacy beyond the bounds of the archway. Therefore, as in Dunn, 
this physical separation evidences the front porch as part of the home’s curtilage.
Furthermore, a front porch on a home in a residential neighborhood is almost exclusively 
reserved as an extension of the home and the intimate activities conducted therein. Unlike in 
Dunn, there is not a sufficient amount of property such that an area may be cordoned off for
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separate, non-intimate activities. While the record is silent on whether any of Mr. Jardines’s 
possessions were on the front porch, it is reasonable to believe that they would also be afforded 
similar protection from theft as though they were kept in the house. Moreover, this Court has 
declared that any detail of the home is an intimate detail. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
(2001). So long as Mr. Jardines uses the porch for any activity that he would conduct within the 
house, the front porch will be considered an extension of the home. Thus, it is clear that Mr. 
Jardines’s front porch is a protected area of his home.
Even though the porch is visible from the public street, it still retains its protections under 
the Fourth Amendment. Although the front porch may be observed by passersby and accessed 
by persons with legitimate business with Mr. Jardines, that does not open the area adjacent to the 
house’s front door to a warrantless police search. The police canine and his handler entered the 
front porch with the sole intention of conducting a sniff for narcotics inside the home. The 
record infonns this Court of not only the canine’s specialized training in narcotics detection but 
also of his limited availability due to multiple other operations. Furthermore, the record does not 
state that Detective Pedraja had to call the canine to Mr. Jardines’s home. This Court may infer 
from the omission of how the busy canine arrived at Mr. Jardines’s home and its availability to 
search the home only fifteen minutes after Detective Pedraja started conducting surveillance that 
the search was plamied prior to the operation. Therefore, this warrantless action is 
distinguishable from a delivery person or even a police officer who follows the knock-and-talk 
protocol. There is an inherent difference between observing by one’s own senses the presence ot 
illegal activity while lawfully on an individual's property and the use of a sense-enhancing tool 
such as a trained canine to substantiate an unreliable, anonymous tip before obtaining a warrant.
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Through a consideration of the factors enumerated in Dunn, it is clear that Mr. Jardines s 
front porch “is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home s 
‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. Ihus, the police canine s 
sniff investigated Mr. Jardines's constitutionally protected space in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.
3. This Court’s previous canine sniff jurisprudence has only addressed sniffs 
conducted in public places, but this Court has never squarely addressed 
such an investigation of a private home where the expectation of privacy is 
at its highest.
The sniff at Mr. Jardines’s home is fundamentally different from previous canine sniff 
cases. In situations involving environments with lower standards of privacy protection, this 
Court has held that a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection canine is not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). See also Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2001); 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,124 (1984). However, unlike the search contexts m 
those cases, the home is subject to a heightened standard of privacy. See genet ally Payton, 445 
U.S. 573. Compared to automobiles and other easily moved property, the home enjoys 
especially strong protection against warrantless searches. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 
(1974). It is one thing to say that a sniff in an airport is not a search, but quite another to say that 
a sniff can rtever be a search. United States v. 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2dCir. 1985).
For example, in Cardwell, police officers conducted a warrantless canine sniff search on 
the exterior of Mr. Lewis’ car and discovered evidence that was later admitted at trial. Cardwell, 
417 U.S. at 587-88. This Court expanded in Katz, holding that “[o]ne has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in a motor vehicle [than in one’s person or a building] because its function is 
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence.” Id. at 590.
Here, as in Cardwell, law eiitbrccmcnt inspected tlie interior of an individual’s private 
property without following constitutional and judicial safeguards. However, in the instant case, 
the multi-agency operation examined the interior of Mr. Jardines’s home, not his automobile or 
personal effects. As noted in Cardwell, this Court affords the home a particularly high level ot 
protection from intrusion. 417 U.S. at 590. Part of this Court’s reasoning was that a car has 
“little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.” Id. This Court has noted that a car rarely contains 
the personal effects that are expected to be found and held privately within the home. Id. Mr. 
Jardines’s house receives the highest protection under the Fourth Amendment, which grants him 
the justifiable expectation that his home will not be subjected to an unreasonable search. It is 
entirely unreasonable under this Court's jurisprudence for Mr. Jardincs to have expected that his 
home could be subjected to such an invasive, warrantless investigation.
In Place, authorities subjected Mr. Place's luggage to a narcotics detection test through 
the use of a detection canine. 462 U.S. at 699. This Court held that the agents’ course of 
investigation ~ using a narcotics detection animal to test luggage in a public place - “did not 
constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” hi. at 707. Similarly, in 
Caballes, police tested Mr. Caballes’ car for the presence of narcotics during a lawful traffic 
stop. 543 U.S. at 406. This Court held that a narcotics investigation by a police canine “during a 
lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.” Id. at 409.
Here, unlike in Place and Caballes, the inquiry concerns a private and highly protected 
home. This difference changes the determination of whether an “intrusion on [Mr. Jardines s] 
privacy expectations [rises] to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.’ Id. In its 
Place decision, this Court explicitly noted that a Fourth Amendment search was not triggered 
due, in part, to the fact that the search took place in a highly public environment. 462 U.S. at
707. The widely-known searches and temporary transfers of luggage in a routine airport visit are 
such that one has a lower subjective expectation of privacy while traveling. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 
1366-67. It is widely accepted that security measures have lowered a traveler’s expectation of 
privacy in the airport. Andrew Hessick, The Federalization of Airport Security: Privacy 
Implications, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 43, 56 (2002). In contrast, this Court has held that the home is 
an individual’s last bastion of privacy. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. Mr. Jardines had no reason 
to expect that a drug detection canine would be sniffing areas of his home in search of criminal 
wrongdoing. Therefore, unlike the trade-off required for air travel, Mr. Jardines did not 
implicitly consent to any search nor did he waive his right to privacy within his home.
Similarly, as discussed in Caballes, one’s car, particularly on a public road, has a level of 
protection lower than the private home. As it did in Place, this Court narrowed its holding when 
it noted that the sniff was performed while Mr. Caballes “was lawfully seized for a traffic 
violation.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. This Court recognized that the unique setting—a lawfully 
stopped car on a public road—figured into the evaluation of whether or not a canine s sniff rose 
to the level of constitutional impermissibility. In the present case, the traditionally observed 
sanctity of the home creates a bright line rule for searches. Unlike Caballes, Mr. Jardines did not 
yield his high expectation of privacy by driving on a public road or conducting his business in 
plain view of the neighborhood. Unlike the violated parties in Place and Caballes, Mr.
Jardines’s searched property enjoys a privileged position in this Court’s privacy evaluations, and, 







4. The constitutional expectation of privacy will be eroded if courts uphold 
the constitutionality of such powerful, invasive, and potentially erroneous 
innovations used in manners contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s intent.
a. When society has afforded a reasonable expectation ot privacy,
any inquiry into the suspected conduct is irrelevant when making a 
Fourth Amendment search analysis.
When analyzing Fourth Amendment searches at the home, this Court has not concerned 
itself with the nature of the conduct in question. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83 (“The test of 
legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly ‘private’ activity. Rather, 
the correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal 
values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
For example, in Kalz, the Federal Bureau of Investigation suspected that Mr. Katz used 
public telephone booths to carry on illegal activities. Despite their suspicion, this Court found 
that Mr. Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy was neither diminished nor outside ot the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
Although this Court has raised questions of the legitimacy of a privacy right in contraband, the 
Katz Court was not concerned with the nature of Mr. Katz’s business once he shut the door and 
paid the toll. Id. But see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (recognizing no legitimate privacy interest 
in contraband).
In Karo, this Court expanded on its reasoning in Katz when it held that a tracking device 
placed in contraband that transmitted details from within a private home did not forfeit the 
home’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 468 U.S. at 716. Although one of the parties in the 
case told Diug Enforcement Agency officers that the chemicals were going to be used to produce 
narcotics, this Court upheld the high expectation of privacy within the home by rejecting the 





Amendment to determine by means of an electronic device .. . whether a particular article ... is 
in an individual's home at a particular time.” Karo, 468 U.S. at 716.
Similarly, neither the suspicion nor subsequent discovery of marijuana deprives Mr. 
Jardines of his constitutionally protected right to privacy at home. Society alfords the home a 
special expectation of privacy that is not weakened by illegal conduct or contraband. This Court 
has stated that “[t]hose suspected of drug offenses arc no less entitled to [Fourth Amendment 
protection in the home] than those suspected of nondrug offenses.” Id. at 717. As this Court 
made clear in Katz and Karo, when society gives a reasonable expectation of privacy, that 
expectation cannot be undermined without a warrant or special circumstances. As the law 
enforcement officers on Mr. Jardines’s property had not secured a warrant prior to the canine 
sniff, their unreasonable search cannot be justified by their suspicion or later discovery of 
criminal wrongdoing.
If this Court were to uphold that there is no privacy interest in contraband in the home 
while allowing novel and invasive search methods, it would undo centuries of Fourth 
Amendment legal protections. By their nature, Fourth Amendment claims are raised when 
evidence is discovered during a constitutionally questionable search in the hopes ot having it 
suppressed. When an investigation does not recover any evidence, there is no Fourth 
Amendment claim. In a system that holds that there is no legitimate privacy in contraband even 
in the home, the Fourth Amendment’s core protections would be forfeited in favor of an “ends 
justifies the means’* system. Police would be able to search private homes with impunity. If no 
contraband is discovered, law enforcement’s qualiried immunity may protect them from any tort 
claims. If contraband is discovered, citizens will be deprived of a Fourth Amendment claim 
because of the stated lack of privacy interest. The Founders’ emphasis on the protection for the
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home under the Fourth Amendment is incompatible with such a system. There cannot be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home when even the mere suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing can justify a search. Therefore, law enforcement’s suspicion of Mr. Jardines’s 
private conduct is not sufficient to overcome the home's heightened expectation ot privacy.
b. Upholding the use of sense-enhancing canines will weaken the 
reasonable privacy expectation in tlie home and allow police to 
search society’s most private areas indiscriminately.
In Kyllo, this Court noted that “there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common 
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to 
be reasonable." 533 U.S. at 34 (emphasis in original). “To withdraw protection of this 
minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment.” Id. When the government “uses a device that is not in general public 
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search.’” Id. at 40.
This Court’s Kyllo decision reveals an understanding and apprehension that 
advancements in technology will enable searches where previously unimagined by society. As 
noted, society determines whether there is a reasonable expectation ot privacy in a Fourth 
Amendment inquiry. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Certain sense­
enhancing devices are prevalent enough in society that it would be unreasonable to think that one 
would be protected from their use. For example, Mr. Jardines shut his blinds and windows to 
prevent anyone from seeing into his home. It would be unreasonable for Mr. Jardines to claim 
that law enforcement’s use of binoculars to see into an open window of his home constituted a 
Fourth Amendment violation. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 208 (holding that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a back yard when it could viewed from publically accessible
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airspace and air travel is common). By stipulating that the device not be in general public use, 
this Court recognized that any sense-enhancing device must be considered against what society 
would deem reasonable. In its opinion, this Court declared, '‘[wjhilc it is certainly possible to 
conclude ... that no ‘significant’ compromise of the homeowner’s privacy has occurred, we 
must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward." Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 40. In Place, Justice Brennan similarly noted the potential danger of allowing canine 
sniffs and other sense-enhancing tools without the protection of the Fourth Amendment in his 
dissent:
A dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what they 
could do using only their senses. A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable 
dimension to human perception. The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater 
intrusion into an individual's privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at 
least as sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection 
devices.
Id. at 719-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Boyd., 116 U.S. at 635 ( It may be that it is the 
obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional 
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and sliglit deviations 
from legal modes of procedure.”). Justice Brennan’s insight and this Court’s deliberate decision 
to set boundaries on the use of sense-enhancing tools underscores the unreasonable nature of 
employing a trained police canine to search a private home without a warrant.
A narcotics canine, like a thermal imaging device, is a sophisticated piece of technology. 
An average canine becomes a narcotics detection dog after a period of specialized training, 
which involves ready access to various narcotics. Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the 
Training and Reliability of The Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 412 (1996-97). Both 
elements require supplies out of the hands of the general public. Additionally, it may cost 




AfUi/ysis of Caballes, The History of Sniff Search Jurisprudence, and its Future Impact, 26 N. Ill. 
(J. L, Rev. 595, 619 (2006). Although the State may argue that canines have been in use in 
similar forms for hundreds of years and that their abilities stem not from technological 
advancement but evolution, the resources invested in training underscore the additional level of 
sophistication required for police canines. Even if the State were to persuasively argue that a 
canine’s historical utility and innate senses distinguish it from other search tools, this Court 
noted, “there is no necessary connection between the sophistication of the surveillance 
equipment and the ‘intimacy’ of the details that it observes—which means that one cannot say 
(and the police cannot be assured) that the use of the relatively crude equipment at issue here will 
always be lawful.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. Therefore, this Court should extend its reasoning in 
Kyllo to find that the canine sniff at Mr. Jardines’s front door was a Fourth Amendment search.
c. Recent scientific research suggests that dmg detection canines are 
neither infallible nor sui generis.
This Court is faced with a significant question regarding the weight given to sense­
enhancing devices. In particular, scientific research suggests that this Court s acceptance of 
canine sniffs by trained detection dogs as nearly infallible may not be justified. Courts have 
noted that several factors, including the relationship between the handler and canine, affect the 
animal’s accuracy. See United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
Also, there are numerous questions regarding what substances cause a police canine to alert.
Part of this Court's acceptance of canine sniffs as non-searches was that they were sui generis in 
that they only detected contraband items. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. However, research indicates 
that dnig detection canines alert to chemical compounds in narcotics such as methyl benzoate, 
which is also contained in non-contraband items such as perfume and cleaning supplies. Leslie 
A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine
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Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 Or. L. Rev. 829, 838-39 (2009) (internal citation 
omitted). In United States v. Funds in Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars, 
the court cited scientific research that found that “dogs cannot smell cocaine at all because the 
narcotic acts as an anesthetic that deadens the olfactory senses.” 403 F.3d 448, 458 (11th Cir. 
2005). This Court made clear that the ability to detect non-contraband items is significant in the 
Fourth Amendment analysis. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (observing that the themial-imaging scan 
“might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna 
and bath”). Therefore, such aindamental errors call into question the very justification for giving 
the canines such credibility. While police canines can be accurate in certain instances, the fact 
that a possible false positive will lead to an invasive search of an innocent individual’s home 
should give this Court pause before continuing to categorically accept the results of a canine 
sniff
The multi-agency, coordinated operation to investigate Mr. Jardines’s private home 
through the use of a sense-enhancing canine constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Mr. Jardines exhibited an actual expectation of privacy by taking action to keep the prying eyes 
of the public from the conduct within his home. Mr. Jardines’s home was also entitled to not 
only a reasonable expectation of privacy, but a heightened e.xpectation. Mr. Jardines’s 
expectations of privacy satisfy the test laid out by this Court in Katz and widely accepted 
thereafter. The sniff violated these privacy expectations by uncovering protected details from 
within the home. Thus, the canine sniff was a Fourth Amendment search.
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II. PROBING INTO I'ME CONTENTS OF A CITIZEN'S PRIVAFE HOME WITH A 
SENSE-ENHANCING TOOL REQUIRES A SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED ONLY 
UPON AN EVIDENTIARY SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING NO SUCH SHOWING WAS MADE.
Under the Fourth Amendment, police are permitted to conduct a search in two sets ot
circumstances. First, a police officer may present facts, memorialized in a waiTant affidavit, to a
local judge. If the judge finds that the police have established probable cause to conduct a
search, the judge issues a warrant, and the police may proceed with a lawful search. Second, if
special, judicially recognized circumstances render the formalized warrant procedure
impracticable, an officer may proceed to conduct a reasonable search. See Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. ofS.F., 387 U.S. 523, 533
(1967). For instance, an officer may conduct a warrantless search ot a vehicle because the
suspect might simply drive away while the officer works to obtain a warrant. See Dyson, 527
U.S. at 466-67- In either case—whether warranted or warrantless—a search is generally
reasonable only if conducted based on probable cause that the search will uncover criminal
activity or contraband. See Sihron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968).
The probable cause and warrants requirements, as fundamental parts of the Fourth 
Amendment, must be construed so as to further protection of citizens’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). Any physical or sensory 
intrusion into that which should be kept private is “presumptively unreasonable in the absence of 
a search warrant” issued upon probable cause. Id.
A. Probable Cause Is the Appropriate Evidentiary Requirement for a_Sea_rch Under 
the Fourth Amendment. Except in Carefully Limited Circumstances, None of 
Which Are Found Here.
While the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places, ’ a court’s assessment of 
objective reasonableness must undoubtedly depend on the place being invaded. Id. Because the
police search took place at Mr. Jardines’s private home, it required a warrant based on probable 
cause. As the officers had not obtained a warrant or established probable cause prior to the 
police canine’s sniff, the search was unreasonable.
1. There is no such thing as a “minimally intrusive” law enforcement search 
of a person’s home.
“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” Silverman, 365 U.S. at 
511. See U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mick, 407 U.S. at 313 (“[E]nti7 of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”). A citizen’s home is 
“most sacrosanct” under the Fourth Amendment, “and receives the greatest... protection.” 
United States v. McGoiigh, 412 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005). See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 
(“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and 
hence constitutional must be answered no.”).
This Court “has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without 
consent physically entrench into a man’s office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and 
relate at the man’s subsequent criminal trial what was seenf,] heard[,j” or smelled. Silverman, 
365 U.S. at 511-12. Thus, the Constitution acts as a safeguard for citizens’ privacy rights by 
requiring a neutral judicial officer to assess the circumstances of a search and determine if the 
search is justified. The decision to search a private home is not reserved for law enlorcement 
officers. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455-56 (1948) (holding that the right of 
privacy in one's home is “too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the 
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.... [Hjistory shows that the police acting on their 
own cannot be trusted.”).
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While advancements in teclinology have enabled government agents to peer into the 
contents of a private home, this Court still does not distinguish between types of home searches 
based on their purpose or intrusiveness. See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36-37 (‘The Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to the measurement ot the quality or 
quantity of information obtained.... In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”). The Founding Fathers did 
not leave loopholes in the Constitution through which police might trample fundamental rights. 
An officer’s clever application of unforeseen technology or of a tool not available to the general 
public cannot overcome finnly entrenched Fourth Amendment standards. See id. at 34. Any 
time police use a tool that enhances, beyond normal human senses, an officer’s ability to probe 
into the contents of someone’s home, there must be an evidentiary showing of probable cause. 
See id. To make exceptions and draw arbitrary lines would only create loopholes tlirough which 
clever law enforcement officers can search a private domicile without a warrant and without 
probable cause.
In Kyllo, law enforcement agents used sense-enhancing, thermal imaging technology to 
detect heat emanating from Mr. Kyllo’s private home. Id. at 29. The officers planned to use 
evidence of excessive heat to establish probable cause for a physical search or the home, on the 
basis that excessive heat is characteristic of marijuana growth. Id. at 29-30. This Court noted 
that the thermal scan “took only a few minutes” and was conducted “from the passenger seat of 
[a] vehicle across the street” initially indicating that the search was perhaps less invasive than a 
purely physical intrusion. Id. at 30. However, this Court, refusing to erode the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantee of privacy in one’s home, held that using any sense-enhancing method 
“not in general public use” to gain “information regarding the interior of the home that could not
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otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion” was a search. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34- 
35. This Court held that use of the heat sensor, like any search, was “presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.” hi. at 40. Therefore, this Court ordered the case remanded to 
determine if the police had established probable cause to conduct a search absent the use of the 
thermal imaging tool. Id.
Here, similarly, law enforcement officers used a sense-enhancing tool — a drug detection 
canine - which is not in general public use, to obtain information regarding the interior of Mr. 
Jardines’s private home. As discussed supra. Part I.B.4.b., drug detection canines are the 
product of costly training. While a member of the public could purchase a drug detection canine 
for a substantial sum of money, these animals are not in general public use. Drug detection 
canines are certainly not commonplace, such that they might have any impact on the public’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy. Prior to the canine's search, the officers observed the house 
for approximately fifteen minutes. The officers’ only evidentiary basis for conducting the canine 
search was an air conditioner running on the premises, the blinds drawn shut at 7:00 a.m., and 
the absence of a vehicle in Mr. Jardines’s driveway.
No matter how invasive, any search intended to uncover intormation about the interior of 
a citizen’s residence, for use in a criminal investigation, can only be sustained under the Fourth 
Amendment upon a showing of probable cause. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. Based on the 
unreliable observations here, the trial court did not err in finding that the otficers lacked probable 
cause to search Mr. Jardines’s home.
2. There are no special needs in this case which could justify a relaxation ot 
the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.
This Court has found a narrow set of circumstances in which a search might be 
appropriate on less than probable cause, but only in the presence of special needs. See, e.g., New
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Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 327-28 (1985) (pemiilting school olTiciars search of student^s 
purse because of unique needs and safety concerns presented in public school environment); 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-34, 38-40 (referencing special health and safety needs in context of 
housing inspections); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975)
(recognizing special considerations with regard to border patrol searches); Jerry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1,28-31 (1968) (allowing minimally-intrusive “pat-down” search for weapons to protect 
safety of lone police officer and public). However, this Court has never held that a law 
enforcement search for evidence in a private home can be conducted on an evidentiary showing 
less than probable cause. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in thejudgment) 
(“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court 
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.” (emphasis added)).
For example, in T.L.O., this Court considered whether a school official could initiate a 
search of a studenfs purse without probable cause. Id. at 327-28, 37-38. First, this Court 
concluded that public school officials are bound by the reasonable search and seizure 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 336-37. Next, this Court discussed what makes a 
search or seizure “reasonable”, and stated that “what is reasonable depends on the context within 
which a search takes place.” Id. at 337. This Court applied a balancing test that “balanc[ed] the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entail[ed].” Id. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. 
at 536-37). Weighing the student’s interest in privacy against the “substantial interest of teachers 
and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds”, this Court 
held that a warrant was not required to search the studenfs purse. Id. at 339-40.
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Turning to the issue of probable cause, this Court further held that “the public interest 
[was] best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of 
probable cause.” 'TL-O., 469 U.S. at 341-43. The legality of the search in this special set ot 
circumstances would “depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the 
search.” Id. at 341. As always, in making such an exception, this Court was careful to narrowly 
confine its holding to the context of the “proper standard for assessing the legality of searches 
conducted by public school officials.” Camara, 387 U.S.at 328.
Here, no such special needs justify a relaxation of the Fourth Amendment standard. The 
record details no reason why the officers needed to act so swiftly and without a warrant. There 
was no overriding safety or public interest need at issue; there was no concern that following the 
proper course of a legal investigation - i.e. obtaining a properly-substantiated warrant - would 
frustrate the overall objective. Unlike an automobile or a piece of luggage, Mr. Jardines’s home 
was not at risk of disappearance. Mr. Jardines’s home did not pose a safety or health hazard to 
his neighbors. Additional observation would not have frustrated or thwarted the criminal 
investigation. At worst, following the constitutionally required procedures would have only 
delayed it. The record is devoid of evidence that demonstrates the existence ot any special 
interest that justified an exception to Fourth Amendment requirements. Indeed, this was a 
prototypical, invasive search of a person’s home by law enforcement, with no purpose other than 
to discover evidence for use in a criminal investigation. Therefore, the search of Mr. Jardines’s 
home was wholly unreasonable because it was conducted absent probable cause.
3. The “plain view” doctrine does not justify the intrusion into Mr. Jardines’s 
sacred space because nothing in fact was in plain view, or smell.
Officers conducting a lawful search or who lawfully occupy a place open to the public 
may conduct a further search based on that which is in their “plain view.” See Arizona v. Hicks,
#
480 U.S. 321, 325-27 (1987). '‘An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the 
situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in 
the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character.” Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). In order to invoke the plain view doctrine, however, 
an officer must have probable cause to conduct a fuilher search. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326-27.
For example, in Hicks, officers discovered, in the course ot a legal search, expensive 
stereo equipment in plain view in an otherwise squalid apartment. Id. at 323-24. Because the 
stereo equipment was so out of place, one of the officers suspected that it might be stolen, and 
began copying down the serial numbers found on the various pieces ot equipment. Id. at 323. In 
order to read some of the serial numbers, the officer had to move and turn upside-down a 
turntable. Id. The officer confimied later that the equipment was in fact stolen and the 
defendant was subsequently indicted for robbery. Id. at 323-24. The defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence on the basis that obtaining the serial numbers was an independent search, 
not properly substantiated by probable cause. Id. at 324. This Court held that even something as 
minor as moving a turntable was a search, and outside the plain view doctrine. Id. at 325-27. 
This Court further stated that permitting a lesser standard of cause for such a search was 
practically and theoretically wrong. Id. at 326-28. Such a holding might lead the plain view 
doctrine to be used “to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until 
something incriminating at last emerges.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). This 
Court held that even that which is in “plain view” cannot be searched without probable cause.
Id. at 326-27. Thus, the officer’s search of the turntable based on a “reasonable suspicion 
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 328-29.
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Mere, an extension of the “plain view” doctrine (to that which was in the officers’ “plain 
smell”) is not warranted. Neither officer smelled contraband prior to the drug detection canine’s 
alert. Detective Pedraja stated explicitly that the drug detection canine alerted first and that only 
after the alert did Detective Pedraja smell marijuana. Detective Bartelt never smelled marijuana. 
In fact, Detective Bartelt said that he smelled only moth balls. The canine snitf easily could have 
led Detective Pedraja to subconsciously expect the odor of marijuana before he allegedly smelled 
it. As such, the “plain view” (or “plain smell”) doctrine cannot apply, because based on the 
record it is not clear that the odor was truly in “plain smell” outside Mr. Jardines’s home.
4. The Terry stop-and-frisk exception does not apply because no special 
safety or law enforcement needs are present.
An extension of the Teny stop-and-frisk doctrine is not warranted either. This Court has 
narrowly confined its approval of a “minimally intrusive” search incident to arrest to exactly 
those circumstances found in Terry. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) 
(“Because Terry involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, this Court 
has been carefiil to maintain its narrow scope. Teny itself involved a limited, on-the-street frisk 
for weapons.”); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (“Nothing in Terty can be 
understood to allow a generalized 'cursory search for weapons’ or indeed, any search whatever 
for anything but weapons.”); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65 (“The search for weapons approved in Terry 
consisted solely of a limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects 
which might be used as instruments of assault.”).
Police officers are permitted to conduct a warrantless “stop-and-frisk’ search of an 
individual when a careful balancing of privacy, public safety, and police enforcement issues 
renders such a search reasonable. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-31. In Teny, this Court permitted a 
limited search under the Fourth Amendment, based on a “reasonable suspicion,” to protect the
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safety of both the police officer and the general public. Teny, 392 U.S. at 30-31. The 39*year 
veteran police officer observed three men acting suspiciously on the street. Id. at 5-6. The 
olTiccr believed that the men were planning to rob a nearby store. Id. He feared that the men 
were likely armed. Id. at 6. After observing for several minutes, the officer approached the men 
and identified himself. Id. at 6-7. After questioning the men and receiving a strange response, 
the ofTicer patted down the overcoat of one of the three men and discovered a loaded revolver.
Id. at 7. Upon patting down the other two men, the officer discovered another handgun. Id. The 
defendants moved to suppress the evidence uncovered during the pat-down searches, claiming 
they were searched without probable cause. Id. at 7-8.
On review, the Terry Court held that in the interest of public safety, police should have 
the ability to stop suspicious individuals and talk to them, and upon reasonable suspicion that 
they might be armed, an officer should be able to pat the individual down for weapons. Id. at 30- 
31. This Court was careful to hold, though, that no such search could be conducted on a mere 
■■‘hunch”, but must be based on “reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 27. This Court further noted that “[ejach case of this 
sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts” and that the “sole justification” for 
allowing such a search was “the protection of the police officer and others nearby. Id. at 29-30. 
This Court reemphasized that the search must be “carefully limited ... to discover weapons 
which might be used to assault [the officer].” Id. at 30.
Here, however, no such special circumstances exist. This case represents nothing other 
than a purely investigative police search intended to uncover evidence for a criminal 
investigation. Mr. Jardines’s quiet home presented no imminent safety issues for either the 
officers or the public. The investigation did not aim to uncover weapons, chemicals, or
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explosives. The record contains no testimony that cither Officer Bartelt or Pedraja feared for 
their safety or felt that Mr. Jardincs's home posed a threat to either law enforcement or Mr. 
Jardines’s neighbors.
Further, there was no risk that obtaining a warrant would jeopardize the investigation - in 
fact, the officers obtained a wanant after the canine search in order to enter Mr. Jardines’s home. 
Instead, in the interest of expediency, the police searched Mr. Jardines’s home based on the 
following ‘‘su.spicious” characteristics: Mr. Jardines’s blinds were closed, his driveway was 
empty, and an air conditioner was running. None of these circumstances, when taken with an 
anonymous, unverified tip to the police “crime stoppers” hotline, amount to a special need that 
requires relaxation of the Fourth Amendment standards. In no instance should police expediency 
trump a citizen’s fundamental constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. This is 
especially true when the search takes place at the citizen’s home, creating a public spectacle, for 
the purpose of a criminal investigation.
B. The State Made No Showing of Probable Cause Prior to Searching Inside Mr.
Jardines’s Home with the Aid of Enhanced Sensory Teclinology.
Probable cause is an indefinite, fact-intensive requirement. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). A law enforcement officer has probable cause to conduct a search if 
“the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and 
caution in believing that the offence has been committed.” Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 
(1878). In short, the officer must have “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” McCarthy v. De 
Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881). Good faith alone is not enough; the belief must be grounded in facts 
which a court might find to make the belief reasonable. Director General of Railroads v. 
Kastenhaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923).
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In no case can an anonymous tip alone suffice to establish probable cause. See Gates,
462 U.S. at 227, 237-39 (holding that a fairly detailed, but anonymous, letter regarding criminal 
activity was not enough on its own to establish probable cause). An anonymous lip olfcrs 
“virtually nothing from which one might conclude that [the caller] is either honest or his 
information reliable.” Id. at 227. Thus, an anonymous tip requires “something more” - at least 
some degree of corroboration - in order to amount to probable cause. See id. An inlormant’s 
tip, as part of the probable cause detennination, is to be evaluated in light ot the “totality of the 
circumstances.” /r/. at 238.
Here, the informant was an anonymous individual, and the tip was in the fonn of a 
message left on the Miami-Dade Police Department’s “crime stoppers” hotline. The record is 
silent as to any additional information about the tip itself, the information disclosed, the 
demeanor of the caller, or any other details which might help to evaluate its credibility. See 
generally id. at 227-29. Based on the record, the tip very well could have been fabricated. As 
such, the anonymous tip holds the absolute minimum level of reliability. Further, the remaining 
evidence is insufficient to corroborate the anonymous “crime stoppers” tip. The only evidence 
offered to buttress the unreliable tip was that Mr. Jardines’s blinds were closed at 7:00 a.m., there 
were no cars in his driveway, and his air conditioner was running. The police task force 
observed Mr. Jardines’s house for only fifteen minutes, which is hardly enough time to develop 
any degree of certainty as to the allegedly suspicious activity taking place at Mr. Jardines's 
home. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the canine sniff search, 
there was no probable cause to conduct said search.
Moreover, even if this Court were to find that the drug detection search could be 
conducted merely on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the record hardly demonstrates the
existence of any such reasonable suspicion. Regardless, if this Court were to hold that 
reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard on which to conduct a search of a private home, 
the case must be remanded to the trial court for additional tlndings of fact.
C. Due to the Absence of Clear Error. This Court Must Affirm the Florida Supreme
Court's Decision To Suppress Unlawfiillv Obtained Evidence.
After selecting the appropriate evidentiary burden, this Court must then determine which 
standard of review to apply to the factual findings of the trial court. Clear error, not de novo 
review, is the appropriate standard for appellate review of the trial court’s suppression ruling.
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701-05 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Review under 
a clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential and requires a “definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed” in order to overturn. Concrete Pipe & Prods, of Cal. v. Constr. 
Laborers Pension Tr.forS. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993).
In Ornelas, Justice Scalia noted that de novo review is essentially only useful for 
appellate courts to craft precedent. 517 U.S. at 703-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Mixed 
questions” of law and fact are not automatically entitled to de novo review. Id. at 701. Indeed, 
“deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the 
[trial] court is 'better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that 
probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.” Id. (quoting Salve 
Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)). Where, as in the case of probable cause 
analysis, “a trial court makes such commonsense determinations based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is ordinarily accorded deference.” Id. at 702. Thus, appellate courts should 
defer to the trial court’s ability to hear testimony and consider the facts in light of community 
norms. See id. at 702-03.
Here, the Court should examine the trial court's suppression ruling for clear error. The 
trial court was in the best position to examine the testimony and other evidence in light of its 
expertise and place in the community. Because probable cause is a purely factual and contextual 
consideration, the trial court’s superior familiarity with the record mandates deferential review. 
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court held that the officers had not established 
probable cause to search Mr. Jardines’s home. The record fully supports the trial court’s 
holding. The court concluded that closed blinds, an empty driveway, an anonymous, unverified 
tip, and fifteen minutes of uninterrupted air conditioning were not sufficient to establish probable 
cause that Mr. Jardines’s home contained a sophisticated marijuana grow lab. As such, there is 
an absence of clear error and the suppression order should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the ruling of the Florida Supreme
Court.
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